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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
King interviews Putin 
President Vladimir Putin presented himself to an American audience in an 
interview with CNN's Larry King on 8 September. (All quotes are from the 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE LARRY KING LIVE SHOW, CNN, 8 Sep 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List)  
 
Responding to King's early question of what happened to the Kursk submarine, 
Putin provided a terse "it sunk." When prompted to elaborate on the incident, 
Putin claimed that a "powerful blast" caused the tragedy and that "75 or 80 
percent of the crew died within the first 90 seconds."  
 
On the subject of foreign assistance in the rescue efforts, Putin glided over his 
earlier rejection of international aid by declaring that once an "official proposal 
was tabled," the offer of foreign (British) assistance was "immediately accepted."  
 
When asked about Edmund Pope, the American businessman held on 
espionage charges, Putin replied with a formulaic, "let the courts decide," 
answer. He then added some unusual comments for a former KGB agent: "I don't 
really think that intelligence can be that harmful."  
 
Indeed Putin's take on the role of intelligence stressed the information-processing 
aspects, and its role in influencing decision-makers. Putin returned to the 
question of espionage while discussing the Russian opposition to an American 
missile defense system. Citing its potential destabilizing effect on strategic 
balance, Putin recalled the role of scientists working on the American atomic 
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bomb project, who "on their own will transferred that secret to the Soviet Union" 
in order to "restore the balance." 
 
On freedom of the press issues, Putin sought to deflect criticism by 
characterizing the disputes as financial. Vladimir Gusinsky's Media-MOST 
supposedly was targeted, not for its criticism of the president, but because it was 
operating in the red. Likewise at ORT television, which also works at a loss, 49-
percent shareholder Boris Berezovsky has no real complaint with government 
attempts to gain control of his stock, because they aren't earning him any profit. 
In sum, Putin views complaints about the interference with free speech as "only a 
pretext to be able to cover up their own commercial interests in some quarters."  
 
In general, Putin seemed stiff and curt, yet nonetheless oddly comfortable during 
the interview. Of course, the host wasn't particularly challenging or aggressive in 
his questioning, but perhaps that was to be expected, given the format.  
 
Media war intensifies 
When Putin met with families of the Kursk submariners last month, he 
encountered an angry, tearful crowd. He deflected their anger by blaming the 
media and his predecessors for the problems with the rescue efforts. Claiming 
that the media reports were "lies," Putin criticized the oligarch-owners of the 
media outlets. "They have embezzled enough, bought up the media, and are now 
manipulating public opinion." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1640 PDT, 31 Aug 00; via 
C-ap@clari.net) The transcripts of Putin's remarks, apparently surreptitiously 
recorded, was published in the Berezovsky-owned Vlast magazine. 
 
Putin went on to claim that the media were trying to force the political leadership 
to "fear them and obey them and let them further rob the country, the army, and 
the navy." Funny, that's not what he told Larry King. 
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Boris Berezovsky finally yielded, in his own way, to heavy-handed Kremlin 
pressure to give up control of his shares in ORT television. He has offered 
various journalists and officials partial control of his shares as a means of staving 
off full governmental control of ORT. He announced his intentions in a public 
letter to the president, in which he spelled out both the Kremlin's pressure tactics 
and the repercussions for society. "Last week, a senior official in your 
administration gave me an ultimatum: handover control of my shares of ORT to 
the government or go the way of [Media-MOST chief Vladimir] Gusinsky." 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 0440 PDT, 4 Sep 00; via C-afp@clari.net) 
Berezovsky took the comment to be a threat of imprisonment in Butyrskaya jail, 
where Gusinsky was incarcerated last June until an earlier state-issued amnesty 
award won his release. 
 
"In presenting me with the ultimatum," Berezovsky's letter continued, "you have 
actually posed a very important question to society -- whether or not non-state 
mass media have the right to exist in Russia." 
 
A Kremlin source responded to the open letter, admitting that Kremlin Chief of 
Staff Aleksandr Voloshin had "insistently recommended Berezovsky to [sic] hand 
over his [ORT] shares to the state, but did not threaten him with imprisonment." 
(KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 8 Sep 00; RusData DiaLine-Bizekon News via lexis-
nexis) 
 
The Kremlin source went on to claim that the government would not introduce 
censorship, but rather "certain restrictions," including a possible ban on fanning 
"anti-presidential sentiment" during emergency situations. 
 
In what some are claiming was simply a fall rescheduling at ORT, the weekly 
interview program Vremya was canceled on 9 September. Vremya's popular 
host, Sergei Dorenko, was once a fawning supporter of Putin, but has turned (like 
many others) into a critic of the president. According to Dorenko, the decision to 
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cancel Vremya is linked to President Putin and ORT's coverage of the Kursk 
disaster. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 1014 PDT, 9 Sep 00; via C-
afp@clari.net) Dorenko is one of the journalists to whom Berezovsky apparently 
intended to turn over his shares of ORT. Berezovsky, among others, views the 
removal of Dorenko's program as another attack on freedom of the press, but 
perhaps it is only a pretext. 
 
State Council established 
President Putin decreed the creation of a State Council on 1 September. The 
State Council will not formally be a presidential organ, but will be chaired by the 
president; the secretary will be a deputy head of the presidential administration. 
The council, as currently conceived, will be a consultative body that will discuss 
issues of federalism, the interaction between federal and regional structures, as 
well as executive and legislative bodies. It will meet approximately every three 
months and will form a seven-member presidium, appointed by the president, 
whose membership will rotate twice a year. Members of the State Council will 
serve without paid compensation. (INTERFAX, 1636 GMT, 1 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0901, via World News Connection)  
 
The initial presidium has already been named. Its members are: Khabarovsk 
Governor Viktor Ishaev; Tomsk Governor Viktor Kress; Tyumen Governor Leonid 
Roketsky; St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev; Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov; Chairman of the State Council of Daghestan Magomedali Magomedov; 
President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev. (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 5 Sep 00; 
Russian Press Digest, via lexis-nexis) They represent the seven new federal 
districts. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
New information security doctrine 
Anatoli Streltsov, deputy head of the Security Council's (SC) information security 
department, announced on 12 September that President Putin had approved 
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Russia's new information security concept. The four main elements of the new 
doctrine are: constitutional rights and freedoms (including the development of 
moral values); information support for state policy; modern technologies and the 
domestic information industry; and the protection and security of Russian 
information systems. (ITAR-TASS, 0928 EDT, 12 Sep 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
A reorganization of the Security Council's interdepartmental commissions, 
decreed by the president, has resulted in the addition of a commission for CIS 
affairs. The SC, after the reorganization, also has the following commissions on: 
military security; public security and the struggle against crime and corruption; 
defense industry security; economic security; and constitutional security. (ITAR-
TASS, 1523 GMT, 4 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0904, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
Human rights foundation raided... 
The Glasnost Foundation, a human rights organization that speaks out actively 
against, and holds conferences to deliberate upon, problems like the war in 
Chechnya, as well as FSB (and previously KGB) abuses and corruption, was 
raided by "masked commandos wielding automatic rifles" at about 7 p.m. on 28 
August. (MOSCOW TIMES, 1 Sep 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) This isn't the 
first time the organization has faced reprisal from the power organs: The 
Glasnost Foundation website lists three major raids (with confiscation of property, 
primarily archival material and equipment) by the KGB-FSB, arrests, beatings, 
bureaucratic harassment of, and even the assassinations and assassination 
attempts on persons affiliated with Glasnost. (GLASNOST FOUNDATION 
WEBSITE, via www.glasnostonline.ru)  
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On this occasion, seven or eight armed officers, masked and in camouflage, led 
by an unmasked lieutenant of the 18th Moscow police precinct, broke down the 
back door of the Moscow office, and, at gunpoint, forced the dozen or so staff 
members and visitors present (including a 10-year-old girl) to lie on the floor; the 
officers reportedly kicked Sergei Grigoryants, the head of the organization, for 
not complying with the orders quickly enough. (M2 PRESSWIRE, 1 Sep 00; via 
lexis-nexis) The victims were kept on the floor for about 40 minutes before a 
police captain arrived and demanded to see Grigoryants' documents. When the 
organization's leader refused, declaring that according to the law on police the 
captain had to show him his documents first, the captain said "You know the laws 
too well" and left with the rest of the officers, without offering any information. In a 
telephone interview, Grigoryants told a Moscow Times correspondent, "They 
knew exactly where they were going. This was a conscious, government action 
aimed at intimidating civil society." (MOSCOW TIMES, 1 Sep 00; via 
www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
...just days after demanding a trial of those responsible for the Kursk 
On 22 August, Glasnost was one of the most prominent of the 37 human rights 
organizations which demanded -- in a message addressed to Vladimir Putin, 
Mikhail Kasyanov, Yegor Stroev and Gennady Seleznev -- that criminal 
proceedings be initiated against officials responsible for the submarine tragedy. 
(SEGODNYA, 23 Aug 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
The charges against the military leadership would include violation of a number 
of federal laws and of the constitution. (EKHO MOSKVY RADIO, 1930 GMT, 21 
Aug 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Security services are moving into the XXI century 
The Russian Minister of Communication, Leonid Reiman, signed RF order No. 
130, "On the Procedure for Introducing a System of Technical Devices to Support 
Operations-Investigative Measures on Networks of Telephone, Mobile and 
Wireless Communication and Personal Radio Calls for General Use" on 25 July. 
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Internet, telephone, cellular and paging network operators are to install the 
devices (abbreviated SORM) at their own cost -- then hand over full control of the 
"operations-investigative measures" to the FSB. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 29 
Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0831, via World News Connection) Most Internet 
service providers, aware of the FSB's wrath for non-cooperation, have already 
signed installation plans, but a couple, namely Irkutsk's Delovaya Set' and 
Volgograd's Bayard-Slavia, are willing to stand up and contest the legitimacy of 
the order. (SEGODNYA, 22 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis) In addition to concerns about 
the infringement of citizens' constitutional rights, there are questions as to 
whether the new order could be used for financial advantage. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 6 Sep 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
It depends what you mean by 'healthy' 
Pre-existing cancer, Graves disease, kidney pains, fading vision and severe 
headaches apparently leave one healthy enough to undergo a Federal Security 
Service investigation. Or, at least, this seems to be true for 54-year-old Edmund 
Pope, a former US Navy officer held in Lefortovo on charges of espionage 
(gathering top-secret information on a high-speed underwater missile from 
Russian scientists). The US administration had been slow in responding to the 
situation and did not seriously challenge the arrest until Pope's wife, Cheri, made 
further avoidance impossible: even now, however, there are more words than 
actions taken concerning the issue. (INSIGHT MAGAZINE, via 
www.insightmag.com) A court hearing had been scheduled for 11 September to 
determine whether Pope should be released on health grounds, but it has been 
delayed until 19 September because of a technicality -- Pope had wanted to be 
present at the hearing, and the court has to arrange for him to be brought in by 
convoy. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 11 Sep 00; via lexis-nexis) There was a 
rumor that the FSB may offer to swap Pope for Aldrich Ames -- an odd concept 
considering that both are US citizens and that, even if Pope were proven guilty, 
his offenses could hardly be compared to Ames'. (MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Aug 00; 
via lexis-nexis) 
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The war on crime continues 
In other news, there has been a whirlwind of antiterrorist actions. The fifth phase 
of the Vikhr antiterror campaign, carried out in Russian cities with populations 
exceeding 1,000,000 (but most intense in Moscow and in the Moscow region) 
and involving "preventive" investigation of suspicious persons (read: persons 
from the Caucasus), was launched on 8 August. The campaign already has 
proven fruitful: 408 suspected criminals have been detained and 124 tons of 
explosives, 3,800 firearms and more than 4 million pieces of ammunition have 
been confiscated. (ITAR-TASS, 2016 GMT, 20 Aug 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Nine cooperation agreements to combat organized 
crime were signed in Kyrgyzstan at the meeting of the interior ministers of CIS 
countries. (ITAR-TASS, 0714 GMT, 8 Sep 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Finally, the Russian interior ministry has been closely 
cooperating with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation in combating terrorism 
and organized crime going so far as to select permanent groups of specialists 
who will interact in complex situations. (ITAR-TASS, 1646 GMT 18 Aug 00; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
In another week of non-stop diplomacy, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited 
Japan from 3-5 September, followed by a trip to New York for the United Nations 
Millennium Summit from 5-8 September. But unlike his last whirlwind foreign trip 
to China, the DPRK, and Japan in July, when he stole the limelight from more 
seasoned statesmen, Putin brought no diplomatic surprises with him to either 
engagement last week. 
 
Status quo to reign in Russo-Japanese relations 
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Putin's long-anticipated state visit to Japan was unsurprisingly anticlimactic. With 
a series of other bilateral meetings in the spring and summer under their belts, 
Putin and Japanese President Yoshiro Mori were undoubtedly looking for 
something to show for their efforts. Resolution of contentious issues in Russo-
Japanese relations, however -- most notably the Kurile Islands territorial issue 
and negotiation of a peace treaty which would formally conclude hostilities 
stemming from the Second World War -- were not destined to be among them. 
Regarding these issues, the presidents reached yet another stalemate 
highlighted by a further suspension of loans to Russia by the Japanese. 
 
But the dual track approach once again saved the summit. Under this approach, 
the Russians and Japanese treat the territorial issue and peace treaty as 
distinctly separate from all other Russo-Japanese relations. In effect, the 
approach allows Russo-Japanese relations to progress along one track despite 
the tensions caused by the lingering disputes on the other. And indeed, the 
approach allowed Putin and Mori to sign a package of agreements at the summit 
which look like those signed between allies -- not disputants with raging territorial 
disagreements who are still technically at war. The agreements in fact cover 
relations across the board from trade and disarmament to cooperation on 
international issues such as the Korean Peninsula and terrorism. (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 5 Sep 00; via RussiaToday.com) 
 
Despite the obvious pageantry, the summit does suggest that the thaw in Russo-
Japanese relations begun by Boris Yel'tsin and Ryutaro Hashimoto is deepening. 
However, it also indicates that, although both sides may be ready to eliminate 
these vexing issues, they are not yet ready to make the concessions necessary 
to resolve their differences. In fact, the summit once again only proves that as 
long as relations can continue along a dual track, a decisive resolution of either 
the territorial issue or peace treaty is not necessary. In effect, the status quo -- no 
peace treaty, no Kuriles, no loans -- will reign until either the Japanese give up 
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their claim to what is historically theirs, or the Russians relinquish control over 
what is an issue of pride. 
 
Putin on the hot seat 
Bill Clinton's 1 September Georgetown University speech deprived Putin of anti-
National Missile Defense (NMD) slogans at the summit and turned the media 
spotlight back on Putin's domestic bungling of crises over the past month, 
including the Kursk submarine tragedy and the Ostankino tower fire. As a result 
of these crises and the later firing of Sergei Dorenko, a popular television host 
who recently has criticized the Putin administration, Putin's leadership has been 
brought into question, along with the state of the armed forces and freedom of 
the press in Russia. During his New York stay, Putin found himself on the media 
hot seat on two occasions, once at a posh 21 Club dinner with various media and 
again on CNN with Larry King. Under this kind of scrutiny, Putin was left with no 
choice but to confirm that he had mishandled the Kursk accident by staying in the 
Crimea during the first days of the tragedy. But true to Russian form, he balanced 
this admission of fault with the observation that rushing to Murmansk would have 
been simply for "PR" purposes since he was in close contact with the military 
throughout the crisis. (CNN, 0900 EDT, 8 Sep 00) 
 
Putin's lackluster speech at the UN, instead of repeating his G-8 coup concerning 
an alleged North Korean promise to halt its missile development program, 
reiterated timeworn Russian positions on several international issues. However, 
his statements did reflect the lessons that Russia has learned over the past few 
years, namely the importance of the UN in international affairs. (STATEMENT 
FROM THE RUSSIAN PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UN, 7 Sep 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List) Indeed, Russia's one last bastion of superpower status 
remains its permanent UN Security Council seat. US-led "unilateralism" -- as 
evidenced by Desert Fox, Kosovo and NMD -- embodies one of Russia's greatest 
fears: a world in which the US erodes Russian influence by circumventing 
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Russia's UN veto. Thus for Russia, Putin's speech bore an important message 
since it highlights a main Russian policy concern: staying in the game. 
 
At least in bilateral relations with the US, however, Russia is still firmly in the 
game. With NMD "deferred," Russia and the US used the summit to continue 
negotiation on START III and other issues of strategic stability. Russia previously 
had threatened to abandon these negotiations if the US decided to construct 
even a limited NMD. But on these bilateral issues the sides accomplished little at 
the summit. The one main agreement signed was a Joint Statement on Strategic 
Stability Cooperation Initiative which commits Russia and the US to "finishing an 
agreement on pre-notification of ballistic missile launches... and creating a 
shared early warning facility in 2001." (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BRIEFING, 7 Sep 00; via Johnson's Russia List) But this statement is simply the 
third iteration of the same document signed by Putin and Clinton earlier this year. 
In addition, Shared Early Warning has been an issue on which Russia has been 
more than willing to negotiate, regardless of NMD. In fact, Putin finally agreed to 
open a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow during the height of NMD 
tensions in June of this year. For Moscow, Shared Early Warning means more 
US dollars in Russia, since the project would be US-funded. 
 
In effect, neither Putin nor Clinton got what they wanted. Regardless of US 
dollars flowing into Russia, Putin has still not "won" the NMD debate. The issue 
has only become an unknown factor until the next US presidential administration. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
A curious Federation Council takes form as it is gently put to sleep 
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The membership of the upper house of the Federal Assembly (now officially 
referred to as a "transitional" Federation Council) will be divided between the old 
system of directly seating the governors and heads of the regions' parliaments, 
and the new system of appointed membership until the first of January 2002, 
when the entire house will be comprised of the new membership.  
 
The problem with this long transitional period is that the effectiveness of the 
upper house will be seriously compromised as two classes of members form and 
inevitably battle for power, thus turning their attention away from pending 
legislation. The new, permanent representatives may want control over important 
committees which the governors and heads of regional parliaments will not 
relinquish readily. The rules of the chamber are based on the old system of 
membership, which may not be convenient or workable for the new membership. 
And as the number of Federation Council members seated by the new system 
approaches 50 percent, a battle for the heart and soul of the institution may 
occur. Such a paralysis could provide Putin with a convenient excuse for putting 
the Federation Council out to pasture. 
 
This scenario suggests that the Federation Council may be put out of the 
business of checking the actions of a power-grabbing chief executive who is 
unaware that the Cold War has ended, and a lower house whose singular 
purpose seems to be to sing the praises of the Glorious Leader.  
 
To make matters worse, Putin's State Council, with no independent power 
whatsoever, co-opts the country's only other real source of power, the governors, 
with an illusion of effective participation in the nation's business. And they, like 
the Duma and the "parties" of which it is constituted, walk willingly to the noose 
applauding along the way that finally a decision has been made. 
 
By constructing a system of "federal regions" headed by the president's 
"representatives plenipotentiary," who in fact do not hold plenipotentiary power 
 13 
but are dependent upon Putin's every decision, the governors' collective position 
is weakened further. Again, no one seems to mind. 
 
With the Federation Council effectively out of commission, Putin can shift its 
power onto organs more easily controlled, such as the State Council. It is 
perhaps not for nothing that Putin changed its full title from the Presidential State 
Council to the State Council of the Russian Federation. As discussed below, the 
president's complete control over the membership and functioning of the State 
Council makes it a perfect device for restoring the unquestioned authority of the 
occupant of the czars' palaces in the Kremlin. With the Duma in one pocket, and 
the governors in the other, Putin can finally turn out the light on the Federation 
Council with its pesky streak of independence. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 25 
Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0829, via World News Connection) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Shoigu, Unity and national disaster 
An interesting development has emerged with the twin disasters of the sinking of 
the Kursk submarine and the fire in the Ostankino TV tower in Moscow. Sergei 
Shoigu, both emergencies minister and the head of Putin's Unity party, must 
have learned after Putin's sorry performance in the face of the Kursk disaster that 
the chief executive should be placed in the best possible light during crises. With 
the Ostankino TV tower fire, Shoigu came out quickly with statements that Putin 
had everything well in hand.  
 
The curious point is that the extent of the fire was in large part due to Putin's 
need to be in charge. It took three hours to turn off the electricity once the fire 
had been detected because everyone involved was afraid to move without 
Putin's approval, even the usually independent-minded Moscow mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov. (THE TIMES, 1 Sep 00; via lexis-nexis) The continued supply of 
electricity caused the fire to spread. 
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But this is not important. As long as national disasters can be "spun" by a 
dedicated follower such as Shoigu, Putin's image can be maintained. 
 
REGIONS 
Putin forms the State Council 
Issuing the decree on the first of September, Putin finally has the State Council 
he has so long advocated. The structure is quite simple and will serve Putin's 
interests quite well. He will, of course, be the chairman of the council, which will 
be comprised of the country's 89 governors. To direct, guide and control, a 
seven-member presidium will also be constituted. Presidium membership will 
rotate every six months, thereby eventually allowing every governor a chance to 
participate. 
 
The question remains as to whether the State Council will replace the Federation 
Council, which Putin seems to hint is his ultimate aim. With regards to the duties 
of the State Council, Putin replied that, "It would be improper to entrust the [State 
Council] with new functions while the Federation Council is still functioning. A 
joint decision will be made on ways in which to proceed. Decisions will not be 
made behind closed doors, for any constitutional changes must be consistent 
with the Constitution," he said. (INTERFAX , 1253 GMT, 31 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0831, via World News Connection) 
 
What he means by all this is wholly unclear. Putin bases his decree setting up 
the State Council on Articles 80 and 85 of the Constitution. Why then is he 
speaking of constitutional change? Is he just waiting until the Federation Council 
is dissolved or rendered toothless to put his "presidium" into place? For now the 
State Council is nothing but another powerless organization taking up office 
space, but it has the potential of being something much more than Putin's 
founding decree demurely suggests. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The peril of easy money 
Almost one year ago, the International Monetary Fund began its "tough love" 
policy toward Ukraine. Upset with slow reforms, disturbed by a seemingly 
impotent government, and concerned about possible accounting discrepancies in 
the budget, the organization suspended its $2.6 billion Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) loan to the country and stepped away. The IMF hasn't fully returned to the 
country since, although it has studiously monitored the progress of three audits 
being conducted on the National Bank of Ukraine. This month, the final audit was 
completed and it seems that the country at last may be close to having its EFF 
loan reinstated.  
 
As discussed in the 16 May 2000 NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, the first 
audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) found that Ukraine overstated its 
reserves to the IMF on several occasions in order to qualify for $200 million in 
IMF loans during 1997. "By giving a misleading impression of the size of 
Ukraine's reserves," an IMF news brief stated, "the National Bank of Ukraine's 
reserve management practices may have allowed Ukraine to receive as many as 
three disbursements [totaling $200 million]... that it might not otherwise have 
been able to obtain." (IMF NEWS BRIEF NO. 00/26, 4 May 00) The same IMF 
news brief also ominously stated, "Once a final determination on misreporting is 
made, the Executive Board will decide what remedial action may be appropriate." 
Since that time, Ukraine has existed in a sort of pre-punishment limbo. Would it 
be disqualified from all future IMF lending? Would it be forced to repay the 
improperly received disbursements? Or, would it receive little more than a 
reprimand?  
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Ukraine's leaders, perhaps nudged along by IMF representatives behind the 
scenes, decided not to wait for the final judgment and repaid $96 million of the 
improper tranches last month. The Ukrainian daily newspaper Fakty i 
Komentariyi quoted Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko as saying that the country 
wanted to end speculation and "concentrate its attention on renewing the 
Extended Fund Facility lending program." (FAKTY I KOMENTARIYI, 28 Aug 00; 
via Bloomberg) 
 
That possibility seems much more likely following last month's IMF Executive 
Board meeting in New York. After that meeting, the organization's directors 
announced that the third and final PwC audit of the Ukrainian National Bank had 
turned up no additional instances of misreporting. The audit also confirmed that 
no IMF money had been misappropriated in any way, and that the Ukrainian 
government had fully cooperated with the investigation. With that, the IMF 
directors "expressed concern that the Ukrainian authorities had overstated their 
reserves throughout the entire period under review," sternly reprimanded 
Ukraine, and announced that all future lending would be kept in an IMF account 
and used only to repay the fund. This is, incidentally, the same penalty imposed 
on Russia last year. (IMF NEWS BRIEF NO. 00/77, 6 Sep 00) 
 
The directors no doubt also took note during the meeting of Ukraine's progress 
toward fulfilling the reforms deemed necessary by the IMF. Although a few points 
have not been met, the country seems to have put itself in a good position to 
receive renewed lending. 
 
Ironically, the soon-to-come renewal of IMF lending actually presents a danger 
for Ukraine. Remarkably, against both the odds and the predictions of many 
analysts (including this one), Ukraine seems to be in a more stable fiscal position 
today than when it received regular lending from the IMF and World Bank. 
Today, the country boasts a small budget surplus, significantly reduced pension 
and wage arrears, improved tax collection, and a seemingly complex and well 
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thought out economic strategy. Without foreign lending to depend upon, the 
country has been forced to be self-reliant. It is this self-reliance that could truly be 
endangered by renewed IMF lending. Unfortunately, with IMF and World Bank 
money to count on, the toughest choices may become easier to avoid.  
 
Consider, for example, the words of Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, 
discussing future IMF lending: "If there will be no loans, we would have to 
implement additional measures. For example, today I postponed an approval of a 
cut in budget spending, as there is no need to do that so far. But we will be 
forced to cut the appetites of our ministries if there is no foreign lending and 
additional revenue from economic growth [before the end of the year]." 
(BLOOMBERG, 31 Aug 00; via America Online)  
 
While no one wishes for services to go undelivered, some of Ukraine's ministries 
probably could stand to lose a little weight. With IMF lending secured, this is 
unlikely to happen. Ironically, it was Yekhanurov who earlier had praised 
Ukraine's economic work over the last year, and said with pride, "This shows that 
financial discipline and discipline of expenditures is being established in Ukraine. 
Such policy helps us live using our own resources." (INTERFAX, 30 Aug 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
Of course, given the country's energy, agricultural and foreign debt crises, 
Ukraine has no choice but to accept IMF lending -- to do otherwise would simply 
be foolish and short-sighted. One hopes, however, that this lending will be used 
not as a crutch, but as a cane meant only to steady the step. If it is used 
otherwise, the country's hard-won self reliance could be lost for years to come.  
 
BELARUS 
How to legitimize an unlawful president 
For several months, representatives of just about every European organization 
dealing with human rights threatened Belarusian President Alyaksandr 
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Lukashenka. If he did not meet specific criteria, they told him, the upcoming 
parliamentary elections would not be recognized, and international election 
observers would be withheld in protest. The criteria were basic for any election: 
devising fair, concrete and understandable electoral legislation, providing the 
parliament with meaningful functions and powers, giving the opposition access to 
the media, and stopping political persecution (which includes the release of 
political prisoners).  
 
In a surprise to no one who has watched events unfold in Belarus over the last 
several years, Lukashenka not only failed to meet the criteria, but figuratively 
thumbed his nose at them. "We are holding these elections not for the United 
States or the West, but for the people of Belarus," he said many times. 
(REUTERS, 4 Sep 00; via America Online) At the same time, he continued his 
massive persecution of opposition figures. Just weeks ago, for example, former 
prime minister Mikhail Chyhir was again arrested and charged with tax evasion. 
This followed months in prison for another charge that was ultimately dismissed 
by the Belarusian Supreme Court under immense international pressure. 
 
Even with this, the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE, Council of Europe 
and European Union determined that a hearing on the subject was needed 
before deciding whether to send international observers to the election. 
Therefore, the Technical Conference on Belarus was held at the end of August to 
discuss the issue that seemed so obvious to many. At the conference, David 
Johnson, US ambassador to the OSCE, argued vehemently against sending any 
type of international mission to the country for the election. To do so, he said, "at 
the urging of a regime that seeks such observation as a badge of legitimacy 
would be a mistake." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 28 Aug 00) Johnson, and US 
Counselor Andrew Steinfeld, methodically laid out systematic violations of human 
rights by Lukashenka. From the imprisonment of opposition figures to ongoing 
trials of opposition leaders to the disappearance of a number of prominent 
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opposition and media members, Johnson emphasized the United States' 
position. It is a position that turned out to be very isolated. 
 
The conference recently announced that a "technical assessment mission" would 
be sent to the country to view the parliamentary elections. In addition, the 
chairman of the conference announced that the parliamentary assemblies of the 
OSCE, Council of Europe and European Union would "continue their consultative 
and monitoring functions during the parliamentary elections." (OSCE PRESS 
RELEASE, 31 Aug 00) This decision, according to the conference's resolution, 
"does not constitute an act of international recognition of the democratic 
character and outcome of the parliamentary election process." (BELAPAN, 1100 
GMT, 31 Aug 00; BBC Monitoring Service, via lexis-nexis) It does, however, 
provide Lukashenka with exactly the opportunity he needed.  
 
Declaring the decision of "victory," Lukashenka suggested, "This decision 
allowed Europe to save face by not pushing Belarus away," and expressed his 
gratitude to the Europeans for "resisting this [US] empire" and managing to 
"withstand this pressure and not allow the appearance of a new hot spot in 
Europe." (REUTERS, 1 Sep 00; via America Online) One portion of the 
opposition, the splinter Belarusian Popular Front Conservative Christian Party, 
suggested just the opposite. It lashed out at the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring 
Group in Minsk, and suggested, "It will not be possible to strangle Belarus 
quietly. ... The European community will get one more Kosovo crisis." 
(BELAPAN, 1715 GMT, 25 Aug 00; BBC Monitoring Service, via America Online)  
 
The rest of the opposition, however, continued following OSCE 
recommendations, and attempted to suggest that this limited monitoring mission 
was a victory. It also requested that the OSCE respond to Lukashenka's 
declarations that the international community had given in to him and decided to 
send observers. So far, the OSCE has remained silent on that issue. With that 
silence, yet another opportunity for the international community to isolate 
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Belarus, support the opposition, and stand up for the people suffering under 
Lukashenka's dictatorship has passed. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Russia abandons Bishkek Treaty 
On 31 August Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced that Russia will 
withdraw from the 1992 Bishkek Treaty which mandates visa-free travel among 
the CIS member states. Since some CIS states have very high rates of 
unemployment, many workers and traders make their living in Russia. At best, 
the imposition of the visa regime will cost them time and money as they return to 
their countries of origin to comply with new bureaucratic regimes. At worst, it will 
make it impossible for them to continue with their current employment. In either 
case, this can seriously undermine the economies of CIS member states. In 
addition, it marks the end of even tentative progress towards a liberal free trade 
regime in the CIS region.  
 
The move represents the latest in a pattern of growing Russian reliance on 
bilateral relations. At Putin's first CIS summit, in January 2000, he initiated the 
practice of limiting all substantive discussion to secretive, one-on-one meetings. 
The same pattern emerged at the August CIS summit. Now, according to Ivanov, 
the existing visa regulations will last another three months, so that individual 
states may negotiate separate agreements with Russia. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, 31 Aug 2000; via lexis-nexis) The shift to bilateralism is reminiscent 
of imperial (or Soviet) arrangements, where each territory maintained relations 
with the metropole but had no forum in common with other territories.  
 
Russian representatives have indicated that those CIS states which have 
subordinated themselves to Russian geopolitical designs -- Belarus, Armenia, 
 21 
Kazakhstan -- need not worry. The move only punishes those states that have 
sought to assert their independence. What will the Caucasian states be asked to 
cede to Russia? Will Georgia be asked to keep Russian bases in place? Will 
Azerbaijan be asked to reconsider its stance on the sectored division of the 
Caspian Sea and the route of the Main Export Pipeline? 
 
The implications for the CIS, as an organization, are profound. It is unclear what 
remains of the CIS structure since the visa-free regime was the only tangible 
benefit of membership. The other pillar of the alliance, the Collective Security 
Treaty, has never been invoked (even in the current war against the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, IMU) and has had a substantial decrease in 
participants as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan left the treaty.  
 
... And jump-starts GUUAM? 
Speaking after a meeting of GUUAM presidents on the sidelines of the UN 
Millennium Summit, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze announced that 
Romanian President Emil Constantinescu had voiced the intention to join 
GUUAM. (INTERFAX RUSSIAN NEWS, 9 Sep 00; via lexis-nexis) Moreover, the 
participants in the meeting pledged to meet regularly and create a more 
meaningful institutional structure for GUUAM. (AZERBAIJANI TV, CHANNEL 
ONE, 1600 GMT, 7 Sep 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The increase in GUUAM's activity "is a sort of demarche to Russia's decision to 
withdraw from the CIS Bishkek agreement" on a visa-free regime for CIS citizens, 
Shevardnadze said. Earlier the member countries of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) indicated that they would maintain a visa-
free regime, promote integration and create a free economic zone. (PRIME-
NEWS, 0755 GMT, 4 Sep 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The GUUAM association was formed in 1997 in response to concerns about the 
upward revision of CFE flank ceilings. Due to profound Russian resentment of 
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the evolution of an independent group of core states within the CIS, GUUAM 
avowed limited economic goals and proceeded only very haltingly. At each 
juncture some of its members were too timid or too distracted by other concerns 
to develop the alliance to its full potential. Perhaps now that Russia has reneged 
on the central element of the CIS alliance, the GUUAM members will be more 
successful. 
 
CHECHNYA 
FSB issues credentials to kidnapping suspect 
The Glasnost Foundation, the human rights organization that was raided recently 
by the Russian security police (See Security Services above), has launched a 
new e-mail Daily News Service covering the North Caucasus region. 
 
On 9 September, the Glasnost Foundation reported that the Dagestan police 
found an FSB license on a suspected kidnapper. (via www.glasnostonline.org) 
Umar Albekov was detained on 6 September in connection with an abduction of 
a 12-year-old boy who had been held for nearly a year and released in exchange 
for $25,000 in March 2000. Albekov had applied for employment with the 
Dagestan FSB in July 2000 and the agency granted him a temporary license. 
The local FSB spokesman, S. Zabitov, told Glasnost that it is typical modus 
operandi for those engaged in kidnapping to seek FSB credentials.  
 
This is only the latest case where the FSB seems deeply implicated in the 
hostage-taking business. (See The NIS Observed, 23 Aug 00) Zabitov's 
comment raises some troubling questions. If it's standard practice for kidnappers 
to seek FSB credentials, why haven't the services taken some trouble to vet their 
applicants? How many other such cases have there been? Is this ever 
discovered by the FSB itself -- or only when its agents are arrested? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
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By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Fighting may be part of a broader plan for regional instability 
Insurgency and instability are the two words increasingly associated with Central 
Asia. And once again in August fighting broke out in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Islamic insurgents operating from bases in Tajikistan staged several 
attacks into a remote mountainous region straddling Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
The attacks are deepening concerns among Central Asian states that a 
concerted effort is underway to destabilize the region. (RIA, 1628 GMT, 6 Sep 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0906, via World News Connection) 
 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been taking up fortified positions in the 
mountainous region to defend against a force of about 700 rebels supposedly 
operating from mountain bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The (IMU) is 
suspected of orchestrating the attacks and maintaining a presence in Uzbekistan 
and southern Kyrgyzstan. The IMU infiltrated these areas from mountain 
strongholds in Tajikistan. (INTERFAX, 1628 GMT, 6 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0906, via World News Connection) All three republics are working together at the 
national level to defend against the guerrilla attacks and have established a joint 
military command center in Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, the IMU retraced the same 
infiltration route into the Batken region bordering Tajikistan that it had used in 
August 1999. According to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), the 
Kyrgyz National Security Council secretary believes the attacks are designed to 
expand drug trafficking routes throughout the Batken region, "the most direct 
and, until last year's incursion, the least guarded." (IWPR CENTRAL ASIA, 18 
Aug 00; via info@iwpr.net) The base of support for the IMU may be widening and 
there are also indications that "Islamic radical cadres are operating underground 
at universities across Uzbekistan, including in Tashkent." (EURASIANET, 8 Sep 
00) The Central Asian governments could use this as an excuse to crack down 
on radical Islamic activity even more, further exacerbating the situation. 
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There has been little or no evidence of fighting in the last few days; however, 
government forces are monitoring the situation closely and conducting 
reconnaissance patrols in the mountainous areas. The southern group of the 
Kyrgyz armed forces, intimately familiar with the local terrain, has established 
and reinforced checkpoints along highland routes and mountain passes as a 
means of checking the movement of rebel forces. (ITAR-TASS, 1243 GMT, 6 
Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0906, via World News Connection) The Uzbek defense 
ministry says it is carrying out "a so-called mopping-up operation" against the 
IMU in southern Uzbekistan and the Tashkent region. Uzbekistan is the 
"strongest military power in Central Asia." (INTERFAX, 1311 GMT, 30 Aug 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0830, via World News Connection) According to Uzbek officials 
and Russia, training and operating bases for the IMU are said to be located in 
Taliban-controlled territory. The 10,000-strong Russian border contingent in 
Tajikistan is tightening security controls in all sectors of the Tajik-Afghan border 
and could call on Russia's 201st Motorized Division, currently stationed in 
Tajikistan, if needed. The Taliban seems to be in complete solidarity with the IMU 
and its aim to set up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, as well as being "likely to 
provide the IMU with massive military aid." (INTERFAX, 1628 GMT, 6 Sep 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0906, via World News Connection) This could mean the rebels 
are being supported by external forces, perhaps some of the same forces alleged 
to be promoting the guerrilla war in Chechnya, thus creating an "arc of instability" 
from the northern Caucasus to Central Asia. 
 
Kazakh officials and Western diplomats believe the insurgents are Islamic 
militants armed and trained in Afghanistan. The international community and 
regional authorities have been asking what is behind the latest attacks. Many 
believe the rebels want to ensure that borders remain open for the illegal heroin 
trade that now traverses the former Soviet republics of Central Asia -- Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan -- or from part of a broader plan for the 
spread of Islamic extremist fundamentalism. According to a spokesman for the 
OSCE, "these countries can cope with the threat now, but it seems to be a long-
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term strategy [by the rebels] to find military and political weakpoints." Questions 
remain about whether the fighting in August was the culminating point or an 
introduction to a more intense war intended to cause greater instability in Central 
Asia. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Sep 00) 
 
Central Asian countries have highlighted the need for closer regional cooperation 
on anti-terrorism and other security issues as recently as this month's UN 
Millennium Summit. While Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
claim they intend to "crush" this insurgency, they lack the necessary resources to 
do so without Russian intervention. Russia is prepared to render military 
assistance to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan "to enhance their defense capability 
and stabilize the region." (ITAR-TASS, 1310 GMT, 7 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0907, via World News Connection) While this does not necessarily mean troops, 
particularly in light of recently announced cuts in force levels and the ongoing war 
in Chechnya, Russia will most likely provide arms, equipment and military 
advisers to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in accordance with bilateral agreements. 
It remains to be seen whether Russia will use this crisis as a means to establish 
a more permanent military presence in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Uzbekistan is particularly wary of becoming too dependent on Moscow but may 
feel pressured to renew its membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty, 
signed in Tashkent in 1992, for accepting Russian assistance. Uzbekistan 
withdrew from the security pact in 1999 after a break in Uzbek-Russian relations. 
(EURASIANET, 8 Sep 00) 
 
The Russian foreign ministry also identified the Taliban in Afghanistan as a 
"source of instability and terrorism in Central Asia, posing a direct threat to the 
interests of Russia, Uzbekistan and other CIS member countries." (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 31 Aug 00) This hard line towards Afghanistan is also 
reflected in Russia's new foreign policy concept, which states that Afghanistan 
"poses a real security threat to the southern borders of the CIS and directly 
affects Russian interests." Russia's preoccupation with Afghanistan is probably 
 26 
due to its historical ties to Central and South Asia (including the 1979-1989 
Afghan war), and the predisposition of the Taliban to export terrorism and 
religious extremism. It also underscores Russia's recent efforts, such as 
reinforcing its strategic partnership with Kyrgyzstan, to forge closer ties with 
Central Asia quite possibly to rein these states back into its sphere of influence, 
as well as create a buffer on its southern periphery against Islamic insurgency. 
Russia's strategic interest in Central Asia most likely stems from its geopolitical 
position and historical ties to these republics. It is also likely that Russia could 
use bases in Central Asia to launch air strikes against rebel strongholds in 
Afghanistan. According to Vremya novosti, "the promised preemptive strikes 
against Taliban bases and camps are starting to look like a fairly realistic 
prospect." (VREMYA NOVOSTI, 2 Aug 00; via Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press)  
 
Whether designed to create a blanket of instability to keep smuggling routes 
open for drug trafficking or part of a strategy for the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism, the fighting has far-reaching implications for both Russia and 
Central Asia and represents a serious threat to regional security. A more 
cohesive and responsive approach, in coordination with some type of regional 
forum brokered by the OSCE to address security issues including human rights, 
is needed to ensure long-term regional stability in Central Asia. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Regional and bilateral interactions help states entrench their positions 
The Baltic states continue their quest to be (just about) everybody's friend, with a 
few notable exceptions. Indeed, in the past few weeks there has been a flurry of 
international activity designed in part to maintain bilateral relations but also to 
cement positions in the world community that may help to ensure international 
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outrage should any neighbor come a-calling uninvited. Such a gambit appears to 
be working, moreover, if statements from US government and non-governmental 
representatives are any indication.  
 
To be sure, no troops have been seen massing at the eastern borders, but if 
words were stones there would be many in the Baltics sporting bruises. Russia 
has continued hurling accusations, even if such claims are increasingly ludicrous: 
The Russian news agency RBC reported that a battalion which purportedly 
included fighters from the Baltic states was active in Chechnya, although there 
was no official confirmation. Members of this battalion, RBC added inexplicably, 
were dressed in Russian army uniforms in order to discredit Russian federal 
forces. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 17 Aug 00) It is 
odd, to say the least, that the media would assume that soldiers in Chechnya 
wearing Russian uniforms would be anything but Russian. Perhaps the folks at 
RBC haven't been watching the news since the invasion last fall.  
 
Rather than respond to such outlandishness, Baltic foreign ministries have 
focused largely on matters of regional cooperation. Baltic and Nordic ministers 
meeting in Denmark last month decided on a psychologically important symbol of 
progress. The meetings, which had been called "5 + 3," will hereafter be termed 
meetings of "8" countries, eradicating an inherently divisive indicator and 
implying a level of equality that the previous term withheld. Officials at the 
meeting discussed European Union (EU) enlargement, regional cooperation, and 
relations with Russia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 
30 Aug 00) Javier Solana, the former NATO secretary-general and currently an 
EU representative for foreign policy, joined the ministers and offered words of 
hope to Baltic aspirants to the EU and NATO. "I am sure that both processes will 
end happily soon," Solana told a news conference after the meeting. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 30 Aug 00) Subsequently, the 
vice president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Tahir Rose, voiced his 
opinion that the Baltic countries should be included in the next round of the 
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alliance's enlargement, and that their membership in NATO would lead to greater 
security and stability not only for them but also for Russia. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 1 Sep 00)  
 
Despite the sublime forecast, relations with Russia continue to be somewhat 
rocky, but apparently everything is relative. Yet another spy scandal erupted last 
month, as the Estonian foreign ministry asked two Russian diplomats, Yuri 
Yatsenko and Vladimir Telegin, to leave the country within 48 hours after they 
were reportedly caught attempting to gather information about Estonia's defense 
forces. "Diplomats are indeed obliged to collect information, but they cannot go 
too deep into guarded details or question people in a way that turns diplomacy 
into intelligence," one anonymous official explained. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 1 Sep 00) In addition to denying Tallinn's charges, 
Russia responded by expelling two Estonian embassy officials. Still, Estonian 
Ambassador Tiit Matsulevits in Moscow remained unconcerned that the 
brouhaha would have long-lasting repercussions. "Estonian-Russian relations 
have never been as good in the past 500 years as they are now," he explained. 
Enough said.  
 
Western, specifically US, evaluations of relations between the Baltic states and 
their neighbor have been quite clear-eyed lately. For example, US Ambassador 
to Latvia James Holmes encouraged Riga to continue its moves towards the 
West and yet remain prepared to accept any Russian overtures, should they 
come. "[E]verybody understands that the slow pace in building bilateral relations 
is due to Moscow as it is Russia which keeps silent and fails to respond to 
Latvia's efforts," Holmes said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 
GMT, 24 Aug 00) Meanwhile, Philip Petersen of the Potomac Foundation, a 
Maryland think tank, was blunter: Petersen advised politicians in Vilnius to 
investigate who is sponsoring the activities of neofascists in Lithuania. "Lithuania 
does not need to prove that pro-fascist forces compromising this country are 
supported by any specific country. To confirm these allegations, Lithuanian would 
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only have to prove that the financing of the activities of these forces does not 
come from within this country," he said. He even offered direction as to where the 
study might first focus. "Russia has been consistent in its opposition to 
Lithuania's NATO membership. Representatives of the US Congress are 
concerned over how Russia is using US financial assistance.... If it turned out 
that part of the US financial assistance to Russia is being spent on interference 
into the affairs of other countries, there would be a great scandal at the US 
Congress," he added. (BNS, 1607 GMT, 25 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0826, via 
World News Connection)  
 
Alas, some officials are willing to give Moscow a bit of diplomatic ammunition. On 
the same day that Max van der Stoel, OSCE high commissioner for national 
minorities, commended Estonia for the country's success in the integration of 
ethnic minorities, an unauthorized leak from the interior ministry demonstrated 
that not all officials are as dedicated to successful social integration as one could 
hope. Jaak Valge, who heads the aliens department for the interior ministry, has 
circulated a draft repatriation program which foresees the reduction in the 
number of Russian citizens resident in Estonia by one-half, or about 50,000, in 
order to solve the country's problems with high rates of unemployment and crime 
among non-citizens. The interior ministry's deputy chancellor for population 
issues, Tiit Sepp, noted quickly that the paper did not represent the ministry's 
official policy. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 23 Aug 
00)  
 
Then again, the official policy of integration engendered some diplomatic whining 
as well. Aleksei Glukhov, the Russian ambassador to Estonia, complained to the 
Russian Duma that a policy of integration means turning non-Estonians into 
Estonians. Apparently, that's a bad thing. In a stunning example of how one 
person can simultaneously understand a situation and yet miss the point, 
Glukhov told the Duma that "After regaining independence nationalist 
governments adopted the course of ousting everything connected with Russia, 
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Russians and our common past ...." (ETA, 0728 GMT, 25 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-
200-0825, via World News Connection) Perhaps the ambassador should re-
examine that "common past" to find clues as to possible Estonian motivation. 
Then again, it probably wouldn't do any good.  
 
While relations with Russia are unlikely to improve in the short term, the Baltic 
countries are working actively to increase interaction with other states. As has 
become customary in the summer months, international joint exercises were held 
with a variety of countries. Latvian and US sea forces worked on dive training in 
Liepaja port at the end of last month (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1400 GMT, 19 Aug 00), while approximately 1,000 Italian servicemen are holding 
a joint military exercise with their Lithuanian counterparts in the Pabrade central 
training ground near Vilnius through mid-October. The exercises will provide 
Lithuanian forces with experience in the armament, technical equipment and 
communication means used by NATO members. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 16 Aug 00)  
 
Indeed, regular interaction with the West has led the Baltics to assume the 
mantle of elder brother with CIS states that are not as far along in their quests for 
Western alliances. Following a meeting with his Georgian counterpart, Estonian 
Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves reportedly said, "Estonia has shown by 
deeds her support to Georgia's integration with Western structures. Estonia is 
ready to share her experience and also Western countries will support it." 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 21 Aug 00) Ilves also 
offered training for Georgia's border guard, police and other forces. Such role 
model activity was not limited to international aspirations, either. Estonia's Pro 
Patria Union invited represented of Belarusian opposition parties to its congress, 
which will be held in Tallinn later this month. "It is Pro Patria's duty, you 
remember how important a visit and advice from each fraternal party was for 
ourselves 10 years ago," explained Prime Minister Mart Laar, who is chairman of 
the Pro Patria Union. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 22 
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Aug 00). Moreover, the foreign secretary of Pro Patria Union, Jaanus Reisner, 
spoke twice at a seminar of the united opposition in Belarus, while MP Aimar 
Altosaar conducted a training course in Ukraine for members of the Belarusian 
opposition parties.  
 
Estonia is also actively pursuing relations with China. On the eve of a visit by Li 
Peng, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(NPC), Riigikogu Speaker Toomas Savi promised a strengthening of economic 
links and expansion of cultural exchanges. (XINHUA, 0530 GMT, 8 Sep 00; 
FBIS-CHI-2000-0907, via World News Connection) Indeed, the improvement of 
Chinese relations was on the agenda of each of the Baltic countries, although the 
leadup to Li's Vilnius visit did not run as smoothly as some would have liked: 
Shortly before Li was to arrive, MP Vidmantas Ziemeles registered a draft 
resolution offering moral support to Tibet and calling for recognition of Tibet as an 
occupied country. (BNS, 1301 GMT, 5 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0906, via World 
News Connection) 
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